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ABSTRACT
Antibiotic resistance, according to the World Health
Organization, is one of the greatest threats to public health.
To combat the problem, new antibiotics need to be
developed. However, antibiotic research and development
is fraught with scientific and economic problems.
Recognizing these problems and the public health threat
posed by antibiotic resistance, Congress passed the GAIN
Act, which President Obama signed into law in June 2012.
The GAIN Act (Act) incentivizes pharmaceutical companies
to invest in antibiotic research and development. This
Article will outline the incentives in the Act and suggest
why the Act may not solve the growing antibiotic resistance
problem. There are, however, areas of promise in the Act
that may mitigate its shortcomings and pave the way to the
possibility of the Act’s success.
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INTRODUCTION
Antibiotic resistance is a worldwide epidemic. It is an acute
domestic problem, as well. In 2006, methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) killed more Americans (19,000)
than emphysema, HIV/AIDS, Parkinson’s disease, and homicide
combined. 2 Furthermore, “[a]lmost 2 million Americans per year
2

Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA), Statement of the
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develop hospital-acquired infections (HAIs), resulting in 99,000
deaths, the vast majority of which are due to antibiotic-resistant
pathogens.” 3
Antibiotic resistance and the lack of activity along the
antibiotic development pipeline are problems worthy of Congress’
attention. Existing antibiotics are losing their effectiveness due to
antibiotic resistance and yet, antibiotic development efforts are
slow to respond to this crisis. Antibiotic development is stunted
because the pharmaceutical companies spearheading research and
development are primarily concerned with maximizing profits and
feel the scientific and economics challenges are not worth the
investment. Antibiotics are typically not profitable for
pharmaceutical companies because they are prescribed sparingly to
stem antibiotic resistance. 4 Moreover, consumers only purchase
small quantities of antibiotics as they are typically used for 7–14
days, whereas some profitable pharmaceuticals are taken for the
duration of the consumer’s life. 5
Congress diverted its attention to the problem and recently
passed the GAIN (Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now) Act. The
GAIN Act incentivizes pharmaceutical companies to develop
antibiotics. However, the GAIN Act’s many incentives for
antibiotic research and development are unlikely to repair the
antibiotic pipeline and stem the problem of increasing antibiotic
resistance.
Part I of this Article will discuss why Congress felt the need to
implement the GAIN Act. Part II will discuss the Act’s incentives
for antibiotic development. Part III will discuss the Act’s potential
problems and explain why it may not repair the antibiotic pipeline.
Infectious Diseases Society of America Promoting Anti-Infective Development
and Antimicrobial Stewardship through the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) Reauthorization Before the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce’s Subcommittee on Health,
IDSOCIETY.ORG, http://www.idsociety.org/uploadedfiles/idsa/
policy_and_advocacy/current_topics_and_issues/advancing_product_research_a
nd_development/bad_bugs_no_drugs/statements/idsa%20pdufa%20gain%20test
imony%20030812%20final.pdf (last visited June 10, 2013).
3
Id.
4
IDSA, supra note 2.
5
Id.
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Part IV, however, will address potential areas of promise in the Act
and will suggest how these provisions may mitigate the Act’s
problems.
I. THE NEED FOR THE GAIN ACT
Antibiotic resistance occurs when bacteria become resistant to
antibiotics after being exposed to them. 6 This resistance is often
due to a spontaneous gene mutation during bacterial cell
replication that allows a cell to continue to divide and replicate,
unlike its counterparts that were killed off by the antibiotic. 7
Increased antibiotic use correlates to a rise in antibiotic resistance
because antibiotic use exacerbates natural selection of antibioticresistant bacteria. 8 Antibiotic resistance due to overuse is an
increasing problem in the United States due to (1) the inappropriate
use of antibiotics, when physicians prescribe antibiotics without
first determining whether a patient has a bacterial infection that can
only be cured with antibiotics; (2) the increased presence of
antibiotics in our food supply, which potentially introduces more
antibiotic-resistant bacteria into the human population; and (3) the
extensive use of antibiotics in hospitals.9 Because hospitals
frequently prescribe antibiotics for patients, hospitals are prime
breeding grounds for antibiotic-resistant bacteria.
The social and economic impact of antibiotic resistance is
enormous and cannot be ignored. “Each year, antibiotic-resistant
infections are responsible for tens of thousands of deaths, hundreds
of thousands of hospitalizations and up to $26 billion in extra costs
to the U.S. health care system.” 10 For example, antibiotic resistant
6

FDA’s Strategy on Antimicrobial Resistance—Questions and Answers,
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/
GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/ucm216939.htm (last
visited Nov. 25, 2012).
7
General Background: About Antibiotic Resistance, ALLIANCE FOR THE
PRUDENT USE OF ANTIBIOTICS, http://www.tufts.edu/med/apua/about_issue/
about_antibioticres.shtml (last visited July 1, 2013).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Pew Health Group, Bill Summary: The Generating Antibiotic Incentives
Now Act of 2011, http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/
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infections (ARIs) increase patient care costs and wage losses
because ARIs typically lead to hospital stays that are up to two
weeks longer than they would be if the patients had not contracted
ARIs. 11 Alliance for the Prudent Use of Antibiotics, a
nongovernmental organization, suggests that a mere 20% reduction
in antibiotic resistant infections would save up to 5.2 billion U.S.
healthcare dollars a year. 12 Despite the extent of the problem, few
pharmaceutical companies are willing to devote the time and
resources to antibiotic development.
There are several reasons why pharmaceutical companies are
reluctant to pursue new antibiotics. One reason is that antibiotic
development poses unique scientific challenges. For example, over
a 10-year period, it took 72 candidate antibiotics to yield one FDAapproved product, whereas other pharmaceuticals required only 15
candidates to yield an FDA-approved product. 13 Drug development
is facing increasing economic challenges—it currently costs $400–
$800 million per approved agent. 14 Further, there are fewer
perceived economic incentives for pharmaceutical companies to
develop antibiotics than other drugs. Antibiotics do not generate as
much revenue as other pharmaceuticals because they (1) are only
used for short time periods, typically 7–14 days; (2) are priced low
to keep the public health free of communicable diseases; and (3)
are sparingly prescribed to curb the problem of antibiotic
resistance. 15 Further still, because there are some generic
antibiotics that are still effective against many bacterial infections,
physicians often relegate newly developed antibiotics to a second

Fact_Sheets/Antibiotics_and_Innovation/Antibiotics_GAIN_FactSheet.pdf (last
visited July 1, 2013).
11
The Cost of Antibiotic Resistance to U.S. Families and the Health Care
System for Consumers, Patients, Policy-Makers, ALLIANCE FOR THE PRUDENT
USE OF ANTIBIOTICS, http://www.tufts.edu/med/apua/consumers/
personal_home_5_1451036133.pdf (last visited July 1, 2013).
12
Id.
13
IDSA, supra note 2.
14
B. Spellberg et al., The Epidemic of Antibiotic-Resistant Infections: A
Call to Action for the Medical Community from the Infectious Diseases Society
of America, 46 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 155–64 (2008).
15
Id.
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or later line of defense against these pathogens. 16
Due to these disincentives, the antibiotic pipeline is running
dry. “In the 1980s, the . . . FDA approved 29 new systemic
antibiotics. That number dropped to . . . nine in the 2000s.” 17 This
comes as no surprise considering that, “compared to the revenues
generated from sales of ‘blockbuster’ high blood pressure or
cholesterol medications that patients take for many years or even a
lifetime, the returns from antibiotics are low.” 18 It is for this reason
that legislative attention has become necessary to combat the tide
of antibiotic resistance.
II. THE GAIN ACT’S INCENTIVES
The GAIN Act provides pharmaceutical companies many
incentives to develop new antibiotics to combat the growing
problem of antibiotic resistance. While there are many provisions
in the Act, this Article focuses only on those that will serve as the
most powerful incentives for antibiotic development and that are
most likely to be effective in combatting antibiotic resistance.
A. The Act Adds Exclusivity Periods to Qualified Antibiotics
Exclusivity is a special protection under FDA rules,
independent of patent protection. Exclusivity provides the holder
of new approved drugs protection from competition in the
marketplace by limiting FDA approval of similar drugs during the
exclusivity period.
Because getting an antibiotic drug market-ready is especially
time-consuming and costly, patent protection does not provide
sufficient incentive to pharmaceutical companies. Pharmaceutical
16

Chantal Morel & Elias Mossialos, Stoking the Antibiotic Pipeline, 340
B RIT. MED. J. 1115, 1115 (2010).
17
Allan Coukell & Sharon Ladin, Testimony before the House Committee
on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Health, http://www.pewtrusts.org/
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Speeches/Testimony%20of%20Allan%20Cou
kell%20and%20Sharon%20Ladin%20re%20GAIN.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,
2012).
18
Pew Health Group, supra note 10.
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companies typically obtain patents at the beginning of the drug
discovery process. However, “taking a novel compound through
pre-clinical testing into clinical studies and all the way to approval
takes a significant period of time—and . . . patents have a limited
lifespan.” 19 By the time a candidate antibiotic is approved by the
FDA and put on the market, the 20-year term of a patent is likely
to be nearing its end. 20 Pharmaceutical companies thus need
additional FDA exclusivity to protect their inventions on the
market after both the lengthy clinical testing and the FDA approval
processes.
One of the Act’s key provisions adds five years of exclusivity
to qualified new antibiotics at the time of their entry into the
market. 21 This five year exclusivity is in addition to the applicable
Hatch-Waxman five-year new chemical entity (NCE) exclusivity,
Hatch-Waxman three-year new clinical studies exclusivity, sevenyear orphan drug exclusivity, or six-month pediatric exclusivity. 22
The Act similarly adds an additional six months of exclusivity
for approved antibiotics that have been paired with a companion
diagnostic test. 23 Companion diagnostic tests are tests that identify
both individuals who will most likely benefit from the antibiotic
and individuals who will most likely have a serious adverse
reaction to the antibiotic. 24 Drugs paired with companion tests are
eligible for extended exclusivity because they further the goals of
the GAIN Act. Specifically, if physicians use companion
diagnostic tests to determine the likelihood of success in the patient
before prescribing a certain antibiotic, such antibiotic will be used
less and will reduce the speed of antibiotic resistance.

19

Robert G. Hibbert et al., FOOD, BEVERAGE, AND DRUG LAW CLIENT
STRATEGIES 109 (Eddie Fournier, 2008).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. Bill Summary: The Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now Act of 2011
(H.R. 2182), supra note 10.
24
Id.; Celia Henry Arnaud, Diagnostics-Drugs Pairings Advance
Personalized Medicine, CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, (July 23,
2012), http://cen.acs.org/articles/90/i30/Diagnostics-Drugs-Pairings-AdvancePersonalized.html.
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B. The Act Provides for Priority Review and Fast-Track
Approval of Qualified Antibiotics
Under the GAIN Act, antibiotic applications will be eligible for
both priority review and fast-track approval through the FDA new
drug application process. 25 The FDA’s priority review and fast
track processes are complex, but new drugs that are able to get
priority and fast track “labels” will get to market significantly
faster. 26 The faster the antibiotics get to market, the sooner the
pharmaceutical companies can reap the benefits of costly research
and development. Because pharmaceutical companies can in turn
invest time and money into new antibiotic research and
development after their previously developed antibiotic is on the
market and bringing in revenue, it is likely that a faster antibiotic
FDA approval process will ultimately bring more antibiotics into
the market more quickly. In 2003, antibiotics under priority review
and fast-track approval had a median approval time of six months,
whereas the median review and approval time was 13.8 months. 27
Together with added exclusivity periods, faster approval time
makes the protection term effectively longer and allows products
to enter the market sooner.
C. The Act Creates a Study on Incentives for Qualified
Infectious Disease Biological Products
Another provision in the Act "direct[s] the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a study to determine the
need for incentives to encourage research, development, and
marketing for qualified infectious disease biological products." 28
25

Pew Health Group, supra note 10.
Fast Track, Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval and Priority
Review: Expediting Availability of New Drugs for Patients with Serious
Conditions, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForPatientAdvocates/Speeding
AccesstoImportantNewTherapies/ucm128291.htm (last visited July 1, 2013).
27
Id.
28
H.R. REP. NO, 112-495 (2012), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/cpquery/?&sid=cp1121EYgl&r_n=hr495.112&dbname=cp112&&sel=TOC
_102426&.
26
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Biological products (biologics) include vaccines, blood and blood
components, allergenics, somatic cells, gene therapy agents,
tissues, and recombinant therapeutic proteins. 29 Congress’ focus on
these qualified biologics could prove instrumental in addressing
the problem of antibiotic resistance and infectious disease control.
Indeed, the near disappearance of mortality from diseases such as
typhoid fever, cholera, typhus, smallpox, polio, and the Bubonic
plague can be attributed to biologics and the development of
immunizations. 30
The Act does not yet delineate specific incentives for qualified
infectious disease biologics, but rather commits the GAO to
devoting the time and focus necessary to find compelling research
and development incentives. The requirements of this provision are
vauge in light of the specific problems posed by biologics research
and development. While "[d]rugs generally have well-defined
chemical structures, and a finished drug can usually be analyzed to
determine all its various components" it can be nearly impossible
to characterize a biologic. 31 As such, biologics “manufacturers
must ensure product consistency, quality, and purity by ensuring
that the manufacturing process remains substantially the same over
time." 32 Drug manufacturers do not face this same quality
assurance problem.
III.

THE GAIN ACT’S PROBLEMS

The GAIN Act, despite its many antibiotic development
incentives, is not likely to keep antibiotic resistance at bay. The
Act is problematic because (1) there are no provisions encouraging
appropriate use and marketing of new antibiotics to prevent
antibiotic resistance to these new antibiotics, (2) the additional five
29

Vaccines, Blood, and Biologics: Consumers (Biologics), U.S. FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/
ResourcesforYou/Consumers/default.htm (last visited July 1, 2013).
30
Peter Barton Hutt et al., Food and Drug Law Cases and Materials 876
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007).
31
How do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
ORGANIZATION (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.bio.org/articles/how-do-drugs-andbiologics-differ (last visited Aug. 9, 2013).
32
Id.
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years of exclusivity at the end of new antibiotic’s patent terms will
increase healthcare costs and thus, limit the beneficiaries of the
new antibiotics to only those who can afford them, (3) the financial
incentives will likely still not be enough to encourage
pharmaceutical companies to invest the necessary time and money
into cumbersome and low-yielding antibiotic research and
development, and (4) the FDA drug approval process is still too
complicated and unpredictable for pharmaceutical companies to
expend drug development costs at the risk of facing eventual nonapproval by the FDA.
A. The Act is Void of Meaningful Antibiotic
Conservation Incentives
The Act, while incentivizing antibiotic development, does not
incentivize appropriate antibiotic use. 33 The use of new antibiotics
without appropriate conservation techniques will allow infectious
diseases to be exposed to, adapt to, and ultimately resist these new
antibiotics. The Act’s proposed remedy—new antibiotic
development—could therefore exacerbate the very problem it was
enacted to address.
Incentives are one of the only tools possible under current law
to ensure appropriate antibiotic conservation. This is because the
FDA currently lacks authority to restrict a physician's prescription
of antibiotics. Alternatively, antibiotics could be classified in a
scheme similar to the DEA's scheduled drug classifications. The
restrictions placed on antibiotic prescriptions could mirror
antibiotic stewardship recommendations. In such a situation there
would be real authority to restrict antibiotic prescriptions.
However, since the scheduling classifications for controlled
substances are based on the potential for dependency, it may be
impractical to create an analogous program for antibiotics.
Hospitals and other healthcare providers will likely need more
incentives to implement antibiotic conservation measures. Indeed,
hospitals can reduce antibiotic use by undertaking infection control
33

Ed Silverman, The Op-Ed: No Gain From Antibiotic Incentives,
P HARMALOT (June 21, 2012, 7:50 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2012/06/
the-op-ed-no-gain-from-antibiotic-incentives (last visited Aug. 9, 2013).
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measures, such as screening patients for infectious pathogens and
isolating infected patients. These procedures, however, take
hospital manpower, time and resources, and are not reimbursed by
insurance. Insurance reimbursement indeed is a powerful tool that
is currently "not well deployed to promote continued antibiotic
effectiveness." 34 Insurance reimbursement "hinders conservation
[of antibiotics] and allows hospitals and physicians to receive
additional payments for out-of-control infections and unnecessary
prescriptions." 35 To meaningfully reduce health care providers’
antibiotic use, the magnitude of financial incentives must at least
match that of the reimbursements they currently receive for
antibiotic prescriptions.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid services have enacted
such a financial incentive. Under pay-for-performance programs,
Medicare does not reimburse hospitals for treatment required due
to hospital-acquired infections. As such, the hospital is financially
responsible for the services it provides to these infected patients. 36
At the state level, California led the way in creating meaningful
incentives for healthcare providers to appropriately prescribe
antibiotics. In January 2008, California Senate Bill 739 became
effective, requiring general acute care hospitals “to monitor and
evaluate the utilization of antibiotics and charge a quality
improvement committee with the responsibility for oversight of the
judicious use of these medications." 37
The Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) proposed
many changes during the congressional hearings on the GAIN Act,
34

Kevin Outterson, The Legal Ecology of Resistance: The Role of Antibiotic
Resistance in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 613, 616
(2010).
35
Id.
36
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services, Hospital-Acquired Conditions (HAC) in Acute Inpatient
Prospective Payment System (IPPS) Hospitals, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/HospitalAcqCond/Downloads/
HACFactsheet.pdf (last visited June 12, 2013).
37
The California Antimicrobial Stewardship Program Initiative,
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/
programs/hai/Pages/AntimicrobialStewardshipProgramInitiative.aspx (last
visited June 10, 2013).
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but Congress failed to incorporate the proposals into the enacted
bill. Among the proposed changes was a stewardship proposal
whereby the GAIN incentives would be limited only to those
pharmaceutical companies that were careful with how new
antibiotics were used. 38 Noting the inherent problem with
providing market protections for new antibiotics, commentators
Robert Weissman and Anthony So of the Huffington Post noted
that “[r]esistance to an antibiotic increases as the drug is used more
frequently, so the use of new antibiotics must be reserved for
resistant infections … monopoly protections [however] conflict
with the need for preservation by encouraging companies to sell as
much of the new drug as possible.” 39
B. The Act Will Likely Increase Healthcare Costs
The GAIN Act will also likely increase healthcare costs. Since
the Act will add five years of exclusivity on top of the 20-year
patent terms for qualified antibiotics, the introduction of generic
antibiotics will be delayed five years, costing the United States
health care system several billion dollars in prescription drug
expenses. 40 However, many Americans are already unable to
purchase needed antibiotics due to prohibitive expense. These
individuals will have to wait out the GAIN Act–approved
antibiotics’ patent and FDA exclusivity phases before an
affordable generic equivalent to come on the market.

38

Kevin Outterson, All Pain, No GAIN: Need for Prudent Antimicrobial
Use Provisions to Complement the GAIN Act, Alliance for the Prudent Use of
Antibiotics, ALLIANCE FOR THE PRUDENT USE OF ANTIBIOTICS,
http://www.tufts.edu/med/apua/news/news-newsletter-vol-30-no-1-4.shtml (last
visited June 14, 2013).
39
Robert Weissman and Anthony So, Generating Antibiotic Incentives
Now: GAIN—Or Just Greed (June 6, 2012, 5:36 PM), HUFFINGTON P OST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-weissman/antibiotic-resistance_b_1572284.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2013).
40
Silverman, supra note 33.
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C. The Act's Incentives Are Likely Not Enough to Incentivize
Pharmaceutical Companies to Undertake Costly and Risky
Research and Development
Moreover, the Act’s many incentives will likely not be enough
to encourage pharmaceutical companies to invest in antibiotic
research and development. Because antibiotic research and
development is notoriously risky and unpredictable, some
pharmaceutical companies may be incentivized to act only when
they are sure they will be able to recoup all of their expenses in the
marketplace. While the five-year exclusivity period will help
pharmaceutical companies recoup more of their research and
development expenses, it likely will not result in the recovery of
all of these expenses. The Act, then, will likely not compel these
companies to undertake antibiotic research and development.
The Act also does not include a potentially powerful
incentive—tax credits. The IDSA, in its report before Congress,
proposed that tax credits would incentivize pharmaceutical
companies to undertake antibiotic research and development. 41 Tax
credits relieve a company of some percentage of the tax burden on
its revenues and therefore are attractive to large firms that already
have products on the market. 42 Tax credits can similarly be
attractive to smaller companies, as tax credits can be transferred or
even redeemed as a cash refund for a company with a low tax
bill. 43

41

Brad Spellberg et al., The Epidemic of Antibiotic-Resistant Infections: A
Call to Action for the Medical Community from the Infectious Diseases Society
of America, 46 Clinical Infectious Diseases 155, 160 (2008).
42
Priya Sharma & Adrian Towse, New Drugs to Tackle Antimicrobial
Resistance: Analysis of E.U. Policy Options, United Kingdom Office of Health
Economics (2011).
43
ELIAS MOSSIALOS ET AL., POLICIES AND INCENTIVES FOR PROMOTING
INNOVATION IN ANTIBIOTIC RESEARCH (European Observatory on Health
Systems & Policies 2010).
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D. The Complicated and Oft-Maligned FDA Drug Approval
Process Remains Largely Unchanged
The FDA drug approval process is known among
pharmaceutical companies to be unpredictable and complicated,
especially when compared to other countries' processes. While
welcoming the GAIN Act's provisions, drug developers and the
IDSA think "more needs to be done to improve the regulatory
landscape and the economics of antibiotic drug development." 44 In
a letter to HHS Secretary responding to Congress' passing of the
Act, the IDSA president stated that "regulatory disincentives
resulting from the lack of clear and feasible antibacterial clinical
guidance for industry has become a towering impediment to
antibiotic development." 45 Biopharmaceutical executives have
similarly suggested that the United States look to Europe as a
successful example of how to implement “a more robust strategy
for funding antibiotic R&D to address public health priorities." 46
In its testimony before Congress, the IDSA recommended that
the GAIN Act include a new FDA approval mechanism—Special
Population Limited Medical Use (SPLMU) Drugs. Under the
SPLMU mechanism, a “drug’s safety and effectiveness would be
studied in substantially smaller, more rapid, and less expensive
clinical trials than traditionally required.” 47 As such, a drug would
be approved for use only in a small subset “of patients for whom
the benefits of the drug have been shown to outweigh the risks.” 48
The smaller clinical trials under the SPLMU mechanism would
make it easier for companies to get FDA approval for new
antibiotics given that the FDA currently requires two large clinical
trials that cost between $50-100 million and take many years to
complete. 49 Further, the SPLMU designation is not dispositive
44

Steve Usdin, GAIN Act, FDA stance only first steps to refilling antibiotic
pipeline in U.S., BIOCENTURY (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.biocentury.com/
biotech-pharma-news/coverstory/2012-11-19/gain-act-fda-stance-only-firststeps-to-refilling-antibiotic-pipeline-in-us-a1.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
IDSA, supra note 2.
48
Id.
49
Id.
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because the drug sponsor can later go “through a traditional study
route for an indication for the anti-infective the limited use
designation could be removed.” 50 As SPLMU drugs would be used
only in those patients with a highly resistant pathogen, antibiotic
resistance to these novel drugs would be slowed. 51
IV. AREAS OF PROMISE IN THE GAIN ACT
A. The Act's Antibacterial Drug Development Task Force
May Address Some of the IDSA's Proposals Not
Expressly Adopted in the Act
The Act’s creation of the “Antibacterial Drug Development
Task Force” may address some of the problems under the current
provisions. The task force is comprised of “scientists and clinicians
from throughout CDER [the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research]” who “will work with other experts from academia,
regulated industry, professional societies, patient advocacy groups,
and government agencies.” The task force’s many goals include (1)
exploring “novel scientific approaches to facilitate [antibiotic]
development;” 52 (2) “identify[ing] issues related to unmet medical
needs for antibacterial drugs, reasons for the lack of a robust
pipeline for antibacterial drug development, and new approaches
for weighing the risks, benefits, and uncertainties of potential new
drugs;” 53 and (3) “participat[ing] in think tanks . . . to address
various issues that could enable [antibiotic] development,
including study design, statistical analytical methods, and approval
pathways.” 54 However, it is currently unclear how much power the
task force will have to suggest further legislative action or to
advise the FDA.
The task force should pick up some of the IDSA proposals that
50

Id.
Id.
52
Antibacterial Drug Development Task Force, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
DevelopmentResources/ucm317207.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
53
Id.
54
Id.
51

16

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 9:1

were not incorporated into the actual text of the Act to address
some of the problems addressed in this Article. One proposal made
to congressional staff could address the potential problem of new
antibiotic development and use leading to bacterial antibiotic
resistance of those new antibiotics. This proposal called “for the
CDC to spend $10 million per year in surveillance, to track the
resistance profiles of the new drugs approved under GAIN.” 55 Such
a surveillance program could ensure that infectious diseases do not
rapidly become resistant to new antibiotics due to overuse or poor
inherent antibiotic properties. While the task force will likely not
contribute to the economic incentives of the Act, it could ensure
appropriate antibiotic use. The more appropriate the antibiotic use,
the less dire the situation in the antibiotic pipeline will become
because antibiotic resistance to the newly developed antibiotics
will be minimized.
B. The Act's Recognition of Biologics as Another Solution to the
Antibiotic Resistance Problem is Promising
The Act’s recognition that biologics, such as vaccines, may
also combat infectious diseases demonstrates that Congress took a
comprehensive approach in shaping the Act. Had the Act solely
focused on chemical pharmaceutical development, the pipeline
would be missing one of its greatest potential solutions—the
development of biologics to complement the use of chemical
antibiotics to which infectious diseases can easily build resistance.
Despite these areas of promise, however, the Act does not go
far enough to make up for its shortcomings in other areas.
Congress should consider amendments if they desire to fully
address the twin problems of antibiotic resistance and the dry
antibiotic development pipeline.
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CONCLUSION
“Although we think of [antibiotics] narrowly in connection
with treating acute infections, their use underpins much of modern
care—from routine surgical procedures to organ transplants and
cancer treatment.” 56 If the GAIN Act is unable to solve the twin
problems of antibiotic resistance and a dried-up antibiotic
development pipeline, the modern healthcare we take for granted
may cease to exist in the near future. While the GAIN Act contains
numerous provisions that incentivize pharmaceutical companies to
develop antibiotics, the incentives will likely not be enough to
encourage companies to invest in antibiotic development over
more profitable drugs. In focusing primarily on antibiotic
development, the Act fails to adequately address the responsible
use of antibiotics. Regardless of whether the Act incentivizes
antibiotic development, it will be for naught if no stewardship
protocols are implemented to stem antibiotic resistance to newly
developed antibiotics.
As antibiotic development and approval is a notoriously
lengthy process, it will be years before the Act’s policies really
take effect. With this in mind, the Health and Human Services
Department recently agreed to pay GlaxoSmithKline $40 million
to develop antibiotics. The agreement further provided an option
whereby the federal government will give GlaxoSmithKline as
much as $200 million over the next five years. 57
Assuming, arguendo, that the incentives are effective, new
antibiotic development alone will not solve the problem of
antibiotic resistance. There ought to be a continued focus on the
appropriate use of these antibiotics along with the exploration of
alternative infectious disease combatants—namely biological
derivatives—to ensure we do not experience the catastrophic
effects that could result from complete antibiotic resistance.
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PRACTICE POINTERS


Hospitals and other healthcare providers should consider
antibiotic stewardship protocols to ensure that infectious
diseases do not quickly become resistant to the newly
developed antibiotics incentivized by the Act.



Should further legislative action be taken to amend the Act,
Congress should examine other countries’ antibiotic
research and development programs that have been lauded
by pharmaceutical and biologics companies as superior to
the United States.



Congress should consider restricting physicians' antibiotic
prescribing authority by implementing a DEA-regulated
scheme analogous to scheduled drug classifications and
corresponding restrictions on prescriptions.



The fact that antibiotic resistance itself could be a powerful
incentive for pharmaceutical companies to enter the market
should not be overlooked. Antibiotic resistance may
actually stimulate rather than retard innovation, as
resistance makes existing antibiotics obsolete, paving the
way for new drug entry.

